Abstract: I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is centered around the state, controlling the signal’s precision at a cost. The principal observes neither the precision nor the signal, but rather, using transfers that can depend on the state, incentivizes the agent to choose high precision and report the signal truthfully. I identify a sufficient and necessary condition on the agent’s information structure which ensures that there exists an optimal transfer with a simple cutoff structure: the agent receives a fixed prize when his prediction is close enough to the state and receives nothing otherwise. This condition is mild and applies to all signal distributions commonly used in the literature.

Abstract: We propose a new method for estimating selection models where the outcome equation is nonparametric and nonseparable in error terms. We show that, given the selection rule and the observed selected outcome distribution, the potential outcome distribution can be characterized as the fixed point of an operator, and we prove that this operator is a functional contraction. We propose a two-step semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator to jointly estimate the selection model and the potential outcome distribution. The consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator are established. Our approach performs well in Monte Carlo simulations and is applicable in a variety of empirical settings where only a selected sample of outcomes is observed. Examples include consumer demand models with only transaction prices, auctions with incomplete bid data, and Roy models with data on accepted wages.

Abstract: Public debt supplies liquidity and collateral services only if institutions coordinate on using the same claim. We study this coordination when use carries a recurring cost and a benefit that rises with other users. Above a quality threshold, two positive-adoption equilibria exist, and under best responses the initial user base decides between collapse and high adoption. Under logit choice, as the population grows and noise vanishes, the long-run distribution selects high adoption only above a strictly higher threshold. Debt issuance improves market depth but eventually dilutes backing per claim. This trade-off creates a range of debt levels supporting the liquidity premium of public debt in macroeconomic models and a narrower range supporting its long-run selection. At the boundary of the wider range, the premium is discontinuous. A matching transfer that corrects the adoption externality makes stationary selection maximize network surplus. Transfers can also help launch a network without permanent support.

Abstract: We study how retained ownership supports the value of a zero-dividend asset held for resale. A sponsor chooses hidden maintenance that determines market survival, bears full cost, and captures benefits only through retained tokens. A positive stationary equilibrium exists if and only if retention exceeds an endogenous minimum, and extra curvature restrictions yield two equilibria. Conditional on survival, prices below the upper equilibrium converge to the lower one. Credible news that future retention falls below the minimum causes immediate collapse through backward unraveling. Thus, insider unlocks affect valuation via governance without changing token supply or cash flows.

Abstract: Mergers among financial institutions can generate information synergies beyond conventional cost synergies. We develop a framework to study how such information synergies affect competition and market outcomes, and show that improved screening by merging firms can distort the allocation of consumers across firms, thereby reducing allocative efficiency. We quantify these effects through merger simulations for the Italian auto insurance market. We find that mergers generate substantial informational advantages, allowing merged firms to cream-skim low-risk consumers and reduce their average expected claim payouts by 7.2–15.5%. At the market level, however, these private gains can come at an efficiency cost: for some mergers, the resulting reallocation of consumers increases the average cost of serving the market by up to 1.4%, or approximately 12 euros per contract.